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Abstract  
  
The research proposed in this paper focuses on gathering evidence from devices with UNIX/Linux 
systems (in particular on Ubuntu 14.04 and Android OS), and Windows 8.1, in order to find 
artifacts left by cloud storage applications that suggests their use even after the deletion of the 
applications. The work performed aims to expand upon the prior work done by other researches 
in the field of cloud forensics and to show an example of analysis. We show where and what type 
of data remnants can be found using our analysis and how this information can be used as 
evidence in a digital forensic investigation.    
  
Keywords: Cloud Storage Forensics, Cloud Application Artifacts, Data Remnants, Data Carving, 
Digital Forensic Investigations.  
 
    
1. INTRODUCTION  
As we all noticed, in the last decade there was an exponential increase in the use of cloud 
computing [1]. Unsurprisingly, this also led to an increase of cybercrime that involves the cloud 
infrastructure, and therefore arose the need of cloud forensics [2]. This increase brought to light 
many issues and challenges for digital forensics experts. In fact, the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) identified 65 of these challenges that need to be addressed 
[3]. There are two means to connect to one’s cloud storage account. The first is through the use 
of a web browser and the second through a client application installed on the user’s device. This 
research will analyze some of these client applications and provide some examples of how to 
gather data. Since the previous work in this field analyzed applications such as Microsoft 
OneDrive, Google Drive and Dropbox on a Windows 7 [4] [5] [6] [7], this research will show an 
example of client application analysis on a Windows 8.1 operating system virtual machine created 
with VMware Workstation 10. In addition, to diversify and provide different examples, the cloud 
storage services that we selected are different from the one chosen by the authors in previous 
work. Nevertheless, after testing these applications, we found that they represent valid 
alternatives to the most known cloud storage services. These alternatives are Copy [8] and 
ownCloud [9]. Dropbox was also analyzed, since unlike Copy and ownCloud it encrypts the files 
that contain evidence, and it was interesting to compare the two different scenarios. To decrypt 
some of the files, Dropbox Decryptor by Magnet Forensics was used [10]. No work so far has 
been done on UNIX/Linux, even though UNIX/Linux-based operating systems are commonly 
used as well, especially when providing applications on a server. The research proposed in this 
paper expands upon the work done by prior research. The chosen operating system is one of the 
most known debian-based Linux distributions, Ubuntu. It is very likely that in the most of the 
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cases, a user downloads the client application on multiple devices. For example, the client 
application can be downloaded on both a PC and a smartphone. Therefore, a second objective of 
this research was to perform the gathering of evidence on a smartphone, in particular on Android 
OS. There are multiple cloud storage services options on UNIX/Linux, however, not very 
surprisingly, Microsoft OneDrive does not provide a client, and very surprisingly enough, at the 
time of this writing, an official client of Google Drive has not been released for UNIX/Linux yet. 
The work in this research has been therefore divided in two main parts. The first on Windows 8.1 
and the second on UNIX/Linux. Finally, in the Conclusions and Future Work section, we will see 
and compare the result between the two different operating systems.  
  
2. PRIOR WORK  
The following literature review, explores the procedures and approaches used by other 
researchers in this particular field. Three main prior and related researches were analyzed to 
discover the approach taken in order to collect artifacts. Artifacts collected can be files either 
accessed or modified by the cloud storage applications on the client devices, or artifacts related 
to web-based cloud storage services (which are accessed through a web browser). Two main 
approaches were identified. The first approach represents a presumption of where artifacts 
should be located on a device, and then perform a search in those specifics locations, based on 
the examiner’s knowledge. Meanwhile, the second approach is based on the use of programs 
and tools, such as Process Monitor from the Sysinternals Suite [11] to determine the location, in a 
dynamic manner, of the artifacts and data remnants. All the prior work done in this field was 
performed on a Windows 7 system using virtual machines. The following is a brief discussion of 
the prior work.  
 
The paper by H. Chung, J. Park, S. Lee and C. Kang [4] provides a procedure to investigate 
devices such as PCs and smartphones. According to this procedure, the investigator collects and 
analyzes data from all devices that a user has used to access a cloud storage service. Based on 
the type of the device that is being analyzed, the procedure can take a different approach. Simply 
put, if the device is a PC then it is very important to collect volatile data from physical memory (if 
live forensic analysis is possible) and nonvolatile data such as files, directories, internet history, 
and log files. Physical memory contains useful information about users and their activities. For 
example, physical memory can contain login attempts and login credentials used to access cloud 
storage accounts through a web browser. If the device is instead a smartphone, and if the system 
is running Android OS, after rooting, it is possible to collect data from the main system folders. In 
the case of an iPhone, after connecting the device to a PC, important data of user activity related 
to the cloud can be found in backup files or in data synchronized with iTunes. Once all data is 
collected an analysis in order to find useful artifacts is performed. According to the paper, 
cloudstorage services can be web-based services accessed through a web browser or client 
applications installed on the device. In the first case, it is essential for an expert to analyze data 
such as web browser log and database files (cache, history, cookies, and downloaded files) that 
are stored in the user profile directory on a Windows system. Cache files include downloaded 
image files, text files, icons, HTML files, XML files, download times, and data sizes. History files 
contain visited URLs, web pages titles, visit times, and the number of visits. Cookie files store 
information about hosts, paths, cookies modification times, cookies expiration times, names, and 
values. Download lists include local paths of downloaded files, URLs, file size, download times, 
and whether downloaded files were successful. Through such web browser files an expert can 
identify a user’s activity, including access or logins to a cloud storage service. However, when a 
client application is installed on a Windows system, traces of it are left in the registry, log files and 
database files. Mac systems have similar traces except registry files. These files are essential 
during a digital forensic analysis, since they provide proof of the use of a cloud storage service. 
These log files contain information such as logins attempts, if and when services were used, and 
times of synchronized files. Database files contain information about synchronized folders and 
files (creation times, last modified times, and whether files were deleted) on a PC. All this 
information can be used to create a timeline of the user activity. In a smartphone device traces 
are left in database files, XML files, and plist files (which contain information about a user 
account). Finally, the rest of the paper provides examples of forensic analysis and shows where 
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data is found on a PC or a smartphone. The cloud services that were used in this work, are 
Amazon S3, Dropbox, Google Docs, and Evernote.   
 
In the research work done by M. Katz and R. Montelbano [5], to obtain the locations of artifacts, 
Process Monitor is used. The result is filtered to show the file system activity, and changes to the 
registry and files. The cloud storage applications used in this research are SkyDrive (now 
OneDrive), Dropbox, and Google Drive. When SkyDrive was installed 4959 artifacts were either 
created or modified. Presence of the files modified using the client, was found in unallocated 
space, $Recycle.Bin CSV files, pagefile.sys, and inside the AppData folder. In the case of 
Dropbox installation, 4163 artifacts were either created or modified. Evidence of deleted files was 
found in unallocated space and in pagefile.sys. During Google Drive installation, 9438 artifacts 
where either created or modified. Evidence of files modified or deleted was found in unallocated 
space, $Recycle.Bin CSV files, pagefile.sys, and configuration files. The result of this research 
proved that a large number of files are affected during the installation of the application, and a 
large number of files are left behind, once the uninstallation process is completed. Evidence of file 
manipulation was mainly found in the unallocated space, $Recycle.Bin CSV files, and 
pagefile.sys. The type and number of artifacts varied depending on the application, but evidence 
of the use of the cloud application was still present after uninstallation of the client in all the 
cases.  
 
The following research, performed by D. Quick, B. Martini, and R. Choo [6], provides a well 
formatted methodology and a very exhaustive analysis of data remnants left by cloud storage 
applications. This research is performed on a Windows 7 machine and the cloud storage services 
analyzed are Microsoft SkyDrive (again, now OneDrive), Dropbox, and Google Drive. The 
objective of the research was to solve questions, such as, which data remains on the hard disk 
after a user used the client software? Which data is left once the user has had access to the 
cloud storage through a web browser? What is the location of the data remnants on the operating 
system and in the memory? Other questions that were attempted to answer relate to network 
traffic data and smartphones. Based on the work of this research, artifacts of files either access or 
modified, and data remnants left behind by the applications are found inside prefetch files (which 
are used to analyze the software activity, such as the number of times the software has run or the 
associated files used by the application), registry files (they can contain references, activities, 
settings or other information), link files (files’ shortcuts), thumbnails pictures within the 
thumbcache, event logs (which contain information relating to system, software, and other events 
recorded by the operating system), and finally, directory lists file ($MFT files). Forensic analysis 
has been also performed on the memory, $Recycle.Bin (in order to find deleted files), client 
applications (analysis of installation path, sample files, synchronized files and folders), on the 
account accessed through a web browser (can contain information about the number and the 
type of devices used to access the storage space), and finally, on the files related to the browser. 
Network traffic was also captured and analyzed to find activity related to login sessions. To 
conclude, data carving was performed through allocated and unallocated data. Thumbnails icons 
and large size pictures were recovered. This research, used a dynamic approach: tools to 
dynamically find evidence that were used were Process Monitor, Wireshark, among others.  
Another research was performed by M. Epifani et al [7], on Microsoft SkyDrive (OneDrive), 
Google Drive, Dropbox, and iCloud. Again in this case, the collection of artifacts left behind by the 
applications was performed on a Windows 7 system. To track the disk usage DiskPulse was used 
(to determine information related to created, modified and deleted files), Regshot, and 
RegFromApp were used to track registry changes. By monitoring the registry changes, 
researchers were able to obtain installation locations and installed client applications versions. 
Other useful data was collected from configuration files present in the installation folder (inside 
the user profile), from online accounts (information about deleted files, devices connected to the 
account, version history for every file, and last browser sessions), from the memory (it can 
contain user email, display name, filecache.dbx path, server time, file list, deleted files, username 
and passwords in the case of a web-based storage access), from Hiberfil.sys and pagefile.sys, 
link files, browser history and cache, registry point, and volume shadow copies. As we can see, 
this research collected evidence from the same locations as the previous researches.   
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To conclude this literature review, we can assert that the procedures and approaches taken in 
these prior research works are in concordance with each other. Even if the approaches were of 
two different types, the locations analyzed and the data remnants found were similar.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY FOR WINDOWS 8.1  
To perform this research and to gather data, both a static analysis and a dynamic analysis are 
used. For example, the directory where all the information related to Google Chrome can be 
found (databases, history files, cookies and so on) are analyzed in a static way. The database 
files were accessed through SQLite Browser [12]. Then, the client application is installed. During 
the installation, Process Monitor and Process Explorer are executed to find the locations on the 
system that stores the main files and directories. It is possible to use the Process ID (PID) of the 
process during the installation in Process Explorer, and use it as a filter parameter in Process 
Monitor. Once the useful data is gathered during the installation, the application is removed and 
the folders that were created during the installation process are controlled. To see if there is any 
data remnant left, the registry is scanned with RegScanner [13] searching for strings that may 
indicate the presence of evidence. In the section called “Recovering Deleted Files”, we will see 
that data carving from the client applications is possible. To confirm this possibility, the TheSleuth 
Kit [14] will be used.  
 
4. MAIN RESEARCH FOR WINDOWS 8.1  
As pointed out in the previous work section, there are two ways to connect to the cloud storage 
account. The first way is through a Web browser, while the second one is through a client 
application. It is important, therefore, to gather information in both cases. This sections contains 
many different subsections that explain where evidence can be found on both the web browser 
(Google Chrome), and in the main directories of client applications. Finally, the physical memory 
contains a great source of useful data. Therefore, a subsection is dedicated to the volatile 
information found in the memory.  
  
4.1 Web Browser Analysis  
C:\Users\<User_Name>\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default is the main directory 
that contains Google Chrome files where evidence of accessing the cloud storage space through 
Chrome can be found and contains the following described files. The table “cookies” inside the 
database file Cookies, stores the creation times of the cookies, the host names, the names of the 
cookies, the expiration times, the times of last access, and the encrypted value. The host name 
field of the table contains the name of the website accessed, and here it is possible to find 
evidence: in fact, some values are .dropbox.com, .google.com, .copy.com, onedrive.live.com, and 
.owncloud.com. The creation times shows when the website was first accessed by the user, and 
the time of last visit. The database file Favicons stores icons associated to websites, along with 
URLs of the favicons. Among these URLs it is possible to find the cloud storage server address 
plus the favicon path. One of the most interesting files in the directory above mentioned, is the 
history database file. The table urls in this file stores the URL of the web pages visited, the titles 
of the pages, the number of visits and the last visit times. The table downloads contains the 
names of the downloaded files, the target paths on the local system, the start and end times of 
download, the received bytes and total bytes counts, the servers addresses, the last modified 
times, among many other useful information. The keyword_search_terms table contains the 
keywords typed inside the browser search bar. The Login Data database file stores the logins 
attempts and the server logins file paths, the types of the usernames (for example, a string 
username or a login_email), the passwords types, the encrypted passwords value, the 
timestamps and other information that can be useful during a digital forensic analysis.   
 
The Network Action Predictor database file contains the URLs visited by the user. In order to load 
web pages faster, based on the input text in the search bar typed by the user, the browser tries to 
predict which webpage should be opened [15]. The QuotaManager database file can contain 
reference to the same URLs. The Web Data database file stores the autofill table, which logs 
usernames and other credential values and personal information, such as the location, address or 
phone number of the user. The files Current Session, Current Tabs, Last Session, and Last Tabs 
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could store a great source of valuable information since they collect all the sessions started and 
the tabs opened by the user. This is in order to restore the sessions and tabs in case of an 
unexpected crash of the browser. Other files that may contain evidence are History Provider 
Cache, which appears to contain random strings and references to the user activity.   
 
Once useful artifacts have been looked through the web browser files, it is important to analyze 
the memory to see if it contains references to the user activities on the cloud storage accounts by 
using the web browser. It was possible to find evidence inside the memory by simply taking a 
snapshot of the state of the virtual machine, and then performing a keyword search (after 
importing the .vmem file in a Linux machine, Ubuntu 14.04 64-bit) using the commands strings 
and grep to filter the output. Inside the captured memory there is many useful information. In fact, 
it is possible to locate in plain text user’s credential such as email addresses, usernames, user 
IDs, first names and last names of the user, logins attempts, timestamps of logins, paths on the 
server, server names or server addresses, lists of files accessed, creations times, times of last 
synchronization, uploaded files and sizes, modification times, deletion times, messages and 
actions taken by the server. For example using the keyword login, it is possible to see that a login 
attempt has been made for both Dropbox and OneDrive.  
  
4.2 Client Application Analysis: Copy   
Launching Process Explorer when installing the Copy client application and when running it, we 
can easily find where Copy stores the main files. In our case, the files are located in 
C:\Users\<User_Name>\AppData\Roaming\Copy\. The same result can be confirmed by using 
the PID found in Process Explorer and using it as a filter parameter in Process Monitor.   
 
The following are the important files found during the analysis:  
- config.db: this file stores settings such as the user email, first name, last name, and user 
ID. It also contains the path of Copy’s root directory and the root cache, among other settings. - 
trace.txt: this log file’s entries contain information regarding the hosting machine (operating 
system, host information, etc.), the client application, and the server.   
- synclog.txt: this is another log file and it stores the operations executed by the application 
along with timestamps and other information relative to the operations types. Some operations 
are authentication attempts and file manipulation (such as upload, download, modification, and 
deletion).   
- copy <User_Email>.db (in our case the name of the file is 
cloudstorage.test.mail@gmail.com.db): this file is very interesting from a forensic point of view 
since it contains the list of files and metadata stored in the root directory of Copy.  
After uninstalling Copy, the main root folder is still present on the hard disk, as well as all the files 
contained in the folder. The folder C:/Users/<User_Name>/AppData/Roaming/Copy is still 
present, however config.db, trace.txt, synclog.txt and copy cloudstorage.test.mail@gmail.com.db 
have been deleted. This means that after the uninstallation of Copy, evidence of use is still 
present on the system and some user activity can be determined. Finally, by using RegScanner 
we performed a search based on the string Copy, and it was possible to find some registry keys 
left once is the application is removed and uninstalled. This strengthens the possibility for a 
forensics expert to find evidence related to the use of the client application.  
ownCloud  
 
After installing and executing ownCloud for the first time, the output of Process Explorer is 
checked. The main directory of ownCloud is stored in C:\Users\<User_Name>\ownCloud\. In this 
directory the most interesting files are hidden, and are:  
- .csync_journal.db: this database file contains the metadata for the synchronized files. It 
also stores in the table downloadinfo and uploadinfo, information regarding downloaded and 
uploaded files.   
- .owncloudsync: this log file keeps track of the user and the application activity. Some 
fields of the log entries are timestamps, duration of the actions, files involved, types of instruction, 
working directories, size of files, file IDs, modification times, and so on.  
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During the uninstallation of the ownCloud client application, the uninstaller asks the user whether 
the ownCloud root folder should be deleted or not. If it is not deleted, then the files, database 
files, and log files will still be available for analysis. Otherwise, they will be deleted. However, if 
the hard disk has not been wiped, or the unallocated space overwritten, recovering these files is 
still possible. This will be shown in one of the subsections of the Main Research section. Inside 
the registry, after the client application is removed, there are not many references to ownCloud. 
However, some traces are still left. In fact, the string ownCloud is still present in the AUTORUN 
key.  
  
4.3 Client Application Analysis: Dropbox  
During Dropbox installation and execution, we started Process Explorer, which shows in the lower 
pane, the files that Dropbox opens, reads and writes to. Unlike Copy, Dropbox encrypts the 
configuration and database files, and does not release the decryption keys to the users. Due to 
this reason, it is difficult to open and analyze these files. However, during a digital investigation, 
and with the use of a proper warrant, investigators might be able to obtain the encryption keys 
from the cloud service providers. Nevertheless, as the time of this writing, there is one particular 
tool that allows to decrypt some of the files of Dropbox. The tool name is Magnet Forensics 
Dropbox Decryptor (see the references for more information). To decrypt .dbx files (the encrypted 
files) with Magnet Forensics Dropbox Decryptor the Dropbox’s .dbx file, the output folder where 
the decrypted files will be stored, the Windows protection folder, the value of the registry key 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER/NTUSER.DAT/SOFTWARE/DROPBOX/KS/CLIENT, and the user 
Windows’s account password should be specified within the fields of the tool.  
 
The most important files that can be analyzed during a forensic investigations are stored in the 
folder C:\Users\<User_Name>\AppData\Roaming\Dropbox\ and are contained in sub-directory 
instance1 and are:  
- config.dbx:  this file is one of the encrypted files, and after it has been decrypted with 
Magnet Forensics Dropbox Decryptor it is possible to see that it stores the host IDs, the user’s 
email addresses, the Dropbox root folder paths, among other settings.  
- filecache.dbx: the table file_journal stored in this file contains the server paths, the files 
lists and the files names, the sizes of the files, the modification and creation times.   
 
When Dropbox is uninstalled, the Dropbox root folder is still present on the disk, as well as all the 
files contained in it. The folder, C:\Users\<User_Name>\AppData\Roaming\Dropbox is still 
present, however, the encrypted files have been deleted. There are also many registry keys and 
traces left once the uninstallation of Dropbox is completed, that can be used as evidence of the 
use of client application.  
  
4.4 Deleted File Analysis  
One important challenge that arises during a digital investigation, is the recovery of deleted files. 
The unallocated space can store valuable information for an investigator and cannot be ignored 
during an analysis. There are two methods to recover files deleted from the cloud storage 
account: the first consists of recovering a deleted file from the server-side, while the second from 
the client-side. In fact, both Copy and ownCloud client applications have a feature known as 
undelete. This feature restores a deleted file both locally and on the server. The Dropbox client 
does not have a similar feature, however, it allows to restore a deleted file or a modified file, once 
the account has been accessed with a web browser and not through the application like Copy 
and ownCloud. Dropbox also allows to permanently delete a file, in a way that it cannot be 
restored.   
 
In order to recover deleted files on the client, some basic understanding of the NTFS structure is 
necessary. The NTFS file system maintains a table known as MFT (Master File Table), in which 
each folder and file stored on the file system have an entry. The entries in the MFT table describe 
the files metadata information and contain pointers to the clusters that contain the file’s data 
content. When the files are saved onto the hard drive, both the entries inside the MFT and the 
clusters that store the data are allocated [16].   
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To attempt a recovery of deleted files, we decided to use TheSleuth Kit, which is installed by 
default on a Kali Linux operating system. To attempt the deleted files recovery, we can either 
image the Windows 8.1 operating system, or use VMWare Workstation to mount the hard drive 
as read-only on the Kali Linux virtual machine. We chose to use the second option. Once the 
hard drive is mounted, the command ls –ai, allows to list all files on the terminal, even the hidden 
ones, along with their inode address. The inode address is an EXT file system concept, but it 
basically has the same function as the MFT entry. Using ls –ai we were able find the entry 
number for a file inside the MFT. The istat tool from the TheSleuth Kit prints in output the 
metadata information, described in the MFT. In this output, the the clusters numbers are 
specified. This clusters numbers are the pointers contained in MFT that point to the data content.    
If we open the logical hard drive with a hex editor tool, such as HxD [17], we can prove that those 
clusters really contains the file’s data. The hard drive is organized in sectors, so a conversion 
from cluster to sectors is needed. Since in this version of Windows 8.1, there are 8 sectors per 
cluster, we can use the following equation to find the sector address:  
  
Sector = Cluster * Sectors_per_cluster    (1) 
  
Inserting the cluster number and the number 8 (sectors per cluster) in (1) we obtain the sector 
number, or the sector address. When opening the logical hard drive in HxD, this editor allows to 
jump directly to the specified sector. This will confirm that the sector do in fact contain the data 
content and it is allocated.  
 
Going back to Kali Linux, now it is possible to use the blkstat tool from TheSleuth Kit, which 
allows to see the allocation status of a specified data unit (in this case a cluster). As expected, the 
clusters are allocated. The next step is to un-mount the hard disk, delete the file that was 
contained in those clusters, and then mounting the drive again in Kali Linux, as read-only. We run 
again istat on the same entry address and this time the output is different, since the entry header 
says that the file is not allocated. Even if the file is deleted, the entry in the table is not deleted 
and it still contains the metadata information of the deleted files. When a file is deleted, a Boolean 
value is changed so the file system knows that the file is deleted and it is now unallocated. 
However, the MFT entry still points to the clusters that contain the file’s data content. By running 
the blkstat tool from the TheSleuth Kit toolkit, the output is also in this case different since now 
the clusters are not allocated. Therefore, it is possible to deduce that the file is now in the 
unallocated space. In addition, one can also deduce that when a file is deleted, both the entry and 
the clusters still contain data (the file system can thought to be “lazy”, since it does not wipe the 
content of the cluster). Unless the clusters that contain the file’s data content are wiped by a user, 
or the clusters are over-written by the operating system, when a different file is stored on the 
drive, the data content of the deleted file is still recoverable. A simple tool used to recover the 
content inside the clusters is icat from the TheSleuth Kit. By using icat, the content of the clusters 
is printed on output on the terminal. It is possible to redirect the output to a file and analyze the 
file. The icat tool from the TheSleuth Kit is not the only tool an expert can use. There are plenty of 
recovery tools, such as Foremost and Scalpel and they both represent excellent tools. Finally, to 
prove that our deductions were correct, we open the drive again with a hex editor and then 
access the first sector of the file, and confirm that the content is still there. This deleted file 
recovery demonstration was executed on a file deleted from the Copy root folder, however, this 
method works for every cloud storage client application installed and tested in this research.  
  
4.5 Physical Memory Analysis  
To analyze the memory, a snapshot of the Windows 8.1 virtual machine was taken and a keyword 
search on the .vmem file was performed. Inside the memory there is a great deal of useful 
information and evidence. However, performing a live analysis is not always possible, so there is 
a possibility that memory cannot be analyzed when performing a digital forensic investigation. 
Nevertheless, if a live acquisition of the memory is possible, then memory should be acquired. 
Evidence that can be found inside the memory can include emails and user credentials, personal 
details, passwords, file lists and file’s information, accessed files and folders, processes 
information, processes instructions, host names, loaded libraries and modules, libraries imported 
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through the server, temporary files, accessed database files and log files, log files entries, 
authentication attempts, and so on.  
 
5. METHODOLOGY FOR UNIX/LINUX  
To perform our research, different programs and tools were used. VMWare Workstation 10 was 
used to create a virtual machine of Ubuntu 14.04 (“Trusty Tahr”) 64-bit. Once the installation was 
complete, a snapshot was taken in order to revert to a clean state once the analysis of the client 
application was concluded. After the client application was installed, a keyword search on the 
system was used to find the locations of the files and other artifacts. Specifically, the command 
“find / -print | grep –i ‘keyword’” was executed on the terminal, and the output was filtered to 
gather paths, files, and other artifacts. Unfortunately, there is not a version of Process Monitor 
(from the Sysinternals Suite) for Linux. Nevertheless, the command lsof (list open file) can be 
executed to list files opened by the client process, by using its PID. The tool used to acquire 
memory is LiME [18]. In addition, a keyword search (using for example login credentials) on the 
memory was performed in order to find artifacts.   
 
Ubuntu 14.04 64-bit uses Ext4 as a default file system and to find where the locations of files on 
the file system, TheSleuth Kit was used. In particular, the istat tool is useful to find inode 
information, status of directories, and status about files inside the main directory that are created 
by the cloud storage application in order to synchronize files with web-based the account. The 
istat tool was also used to determine the group to which the inode belongs, and to find the block 
address where the content of the data is stored. Using the dd command it is possible to create an 
image of the partition or, as explained later, to image ranges of blocks and groups. The images 
can be viewed with a hex editor. Foremost [19] is an example of a data carving tool that makes it 
possible to recover deleted files.  Finally, SQLite Browser was used to open database files 
created by a web browser, such as Mozilla Firefox, or by cloud storage applications. The Android 
OS analysis was performed on an Android OS x86 RC1 virtual machine.  
 
6. MAIN RESEARCH FOR UNIX/LINUX  
As pointed out in the previous work section, there are two means to connect to the cloud storage 
account. The first is through a web browser, while the second is through a client application. It is 
important, therefore, to gather information in both cases. This section contains many different 
subsections that explain where evidence can be found on both Mozilla Firefox (which is installed 
by default on Ubuntu operating systems), and in the main directories of the client applications. As 
previously seen, another source of useful information is found on a running system inside the 
physical memory. Therefore, a subsection is dedicated to the volatile information found in the 
physical memory. One subsection will also briefly describe where other artifacts can be found on 
the file system for all the applications and, finally, the last two subsections are dedicated to the 
possibility of recovering deleted files, and the gathering of data on Android OS.   
  
6.1 Web Browser Analysis  
All the web-based accounts for all the applications were accessed through Mozilla Firefox and, 
after operations such as uploading, deleting, and modifying files, the memory was captured and 
analyzed. Inside the memory it is possible to find in plain text users’ credentials such as email 
addresses, usernames and passwords in plain text, user IDs, first names, last names, logins 
attempts, timestamps of logins, paths on the server, server names or addresses, references to 
files accessed, timestamps of creation times, data of last synchronization, files uploaded, files 
sizes, files modification times, files deletion times, messages and actions taken by the server.  
 
Accessing the hidden folder inside the user’s home directory, by default named .mozilla, it is 
possible to find database files that store useful information. The database file content-prefs.sqlite 
contains preferred websites, such as the cloud storage websites accessed. The file cookies.sqlite 
stores cookies that are created when the cloud storage website was accessed. The 
formhistory.sqlite database file contains the history and tracks the websites visited by the user, 
the number of visits, along with the last visited time. The database file places.sqlite contains 
multiple tables where evidence of the use of the cloud storage services websites can be found. 
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For example, the table moz_places stores the name of the server, paths, and files accessed on 
the server, while the table moz_hosts and moz_favicon store hosts names and icons paths. 
Finally, the file login.json stores logins attempts, hostnames, usernames, URLs of the forms in 
which credentials were inserted, encrypted passwords, and MAC times. Inside the user’s home 
directory, the hidden directory .cache contains thumbnails that show pictures of websites and 
accounts accessed.  
  
6.2 Client Application Analysis: Copy  
When the Copy client application is executed it launches a process is called CopyAgent, which 
functions as a background process and enables the application to properly run and execute its 
operations. Once the location of the data remnants was found, by sorting through the artifacts, it 
is possible to determine that the main evidence resides in the Copy main folder and the hidden 
folder .copy, both present in the user’s home directory. The Copy main folder contains the files 
that are synchronized with the account, a hidden folder called .copy-cache, which contains 
temporary files (references to these files were found during the memory analysis), and a hidden 
text file called .user_info, which does not contain any useful information. The hidden .copy folder 
contains two directories: cache and resources, however they are both empty. The most 
interesting information is contained in the following files: config.ini contains the host UUID, which 
is an alphanumeric string of 32 characters; the file config.db contains settings, such as the root 
cache path, the database version, the cloud server address, the root folder path, the 
authentication token, the client ID, the user ID, the user first name, last name, email address, the 
push token and push URL, among other settings. The file “copy <user_email>.db” (in this 
research the email address used is cloudstorage.test.mail@gmail.com.db) contains a list of files 
that are uploaded on the cloud storage space or the files that are synchronized with the local 
folder. The file table in this database, contains the files metadata such as the file path, name, 
parentID, volumeID, inode address, attributes, mtime, rstate, ctime, size, and child count. Other 
tables in this database contain more useful information such as the owner ID and the file 
fingerprint.  The synclog.txt file, logs the application operations such as logins attempts, uploaded 
files, deleted files, and modified files, along with other timestamps. Finally, the file trace.txt stores 
information regarding the user, the process (CopyAgent), the operating system, and the server. 
Another Copy configuration file is contained inside /home/rakesh/.config/Barracuda Networks, 
Inc\Copy.conf. Once the client application is removed, the find command revealed folders and 
files left on system. Since CopyAgent was never installed but simply run from the Copy client 
downloaded folder, once it is removed, it will not delete the Copy main folder; however, a user 
can simply delete the Copy main folder found in user’s home profile. If the user is not aware of 
the hidden .copy folder, this will remain on the system, along with all the information contained, 
which represents a great deal of useful information during a forensic analysis. Even if the Copy 
main folder is deleted, both the inode entries and the data content are still present on the hard 
disk, and unless it is wiped or the data is overwritten, recovery of deleted files is possible (see 
Recovering Deleted Files subsection).  
  
6.3 Client Application Analysis: ownCloud  
Once the client application of ownCloud is installed, the main folder is by default present in the 
user’s home directory. Unlike Copy, there is no hidden folder, but hidden files are present in the 
client main folder inside the user’s home directory. This folder contains the files that are 
synchronized with the account, along with the hidden database file .csync_journal.db. The table 
metadata of the database file, stores valuable information regarding files, such as paths, inode 
addresses, UIDs, GIDs, MAC times, md5 hashes, among other information,. The table version 
contains the version of the client application. The hidden file .owncloudsync.log is a log file that 
stores timestamps, operations executed by the application (instructions), the length of the 
operations, the names of the files involved, MAC times, sizes, the file IDs, among other useful 
information. The configuration file /home/<user name>/.local/share/data/ownCloud/owncloud.cfg 
contains the URL of the ownCloud server, the username, authentication type (http), and other 
settings. After removing the application, the files on the local system will still be present. 
Therefore a user has to manually delete the ownCloud main directory. Unfortunately, from a 
forensics point of view, the database containing the metadata and the log files, even if are hidden, 
are removed with the directory, that includes also the stored files. However, inode entries and 
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data content are still present on the hard disk, so as for Copy, unless it is wiped or overwritten, 
recovery is still possible.  
  
6.4 Client Application Analysis: Dropbox  
Dropbox, unlike Copy and ownCloud, encrypts the database files and log files for security 
purposes. The encryption keys are not released even to the user. However, a tool exists for 
Windows versions that decrypts these files. Unfortunately, this tool does not have a counterpart 
for UNIX/Linux, nevertheless, according to the Magnet Forensic team, a version of the decryptor 
should be available for UNIX/Linux in the future [20]. Once the application is installed and the 
account is set, the Dropbox main folder is created in the same location as Copy and ownCloud, 
which is the user’s home directory. The main Dropbox folder maintains a hidden cache directory 
that stores the files synchronized with the account. In addition to the main folder, there is a hidden 
folder named .dropbox inside user’s home directory, which contains multiple interesting files and 
sub-directories: a file named info.json stores the path of the dropbox root directory and the file 
dropbox_pid that contains the Process ID, the sub-directory instance1 stores all the encrypted 
files so it is not possible to collect evidence unless the files are first decrypted. One of these file, 
is aggregation.dbx, contains timestamp values, server paths, and a blocklist value. The encrypted 
files are config.dbx (contains configuration settings, user, host machine and server information), 
deleted.dbx, filecache.dbx, (contains files metadata), notifications.dbx, sigstore.dbx, 
PENDING_cHDqrT, TO_HASH_3WP99a, and UPDATE_XyrFxy. The folder instance_db stores 
another encrypted file named instance.dbx. When uninstalled, Dropbox does not delete the main 
Dropbox directory in the /home/rakesh folder. Even if the folder is deleted, a user might be 
unaware of the presence of the hidden folder .dropbox, and this will be helpful if the database 
files and logs can be decrypted. Like Copy and ownCloud deleted file are possible to recover.   
  
6.5 Physical Memory Analysis  
As mentioned in the Methodology section, physical memory was acquired using LiME and it was 
analyzed with keyword searches. Volatile evidence found includes names of files present in the 
application’s main folder, recently accessed folders, name and client application main process 
information, process instructions (for example, in the case of Copy, copy-sync, copy-update, 
copy-paused, or owncloud_init, owncloud_commit, owncloud_opendir in the case of owncloud, 
etc.) icons paths, hosts names, loaded libraries and modules used by the process, libraries 
imported through the server, temporary files created by the client application main process in the 
respective application cache folders, database files accessed, log files accessed, log files entries, 
logins attempts and credentials (for example, during the memory analysis after the use of Copy, 
the string –Login-success U: ‘cloudstorage.test.mail@gmail.com’ was found.   
  
6.6 File System Analysis  
Several artifacts are found in various locations of the file system. However, most of these files are 
not useful during a digital forensic investigation, but to only demonstrate the installation and use 
of the client applications by the user. The directories /usr/share/man and /usr/share/doc on 
Ubuntu contain the man pages and documentation of the applications, while the directories /bin/ 
and /usr/bin store executables or daemons files used to launch the applications. A great number 
of icons related to the cloud storage applications are found inside /home/<user_name>/.icons. 
Information can also be found inside systems logs: for example, the log auth.log inside /var/log 
stores command issued on the terminal, along with the working directory and it can be used to 
analyze the user recent activity. The log file /home/<user_name>/.bash_history contains a list of 
the recently commands issued by the user. The dpkg.log contains references to packages 
installed on the system, and it can reveal if any cloud storage client application was installed from 
the commandline.  Other possible locations that may contain useful evidence are the folders 
/home/<user_name>/.local/share/Trash, which stores deleted files, and 
/home/rakesh/.cache/thumbnails, which contains thumbnails associated with the client 
applications.  If an application during its execution should crash, the syslog and kern.log files 
found inside /var/log store references of the crash. The log file history.log contains the recently 
installed packages and the command issued to install them, while term.log contains libraries used 
to install the applications.   
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6.7 Deleted File Analysis  
It was well clear and established in the Prior Work section that it is possible to find artifacts of 
cloud applications inside the unallocated space. Therefore, it is possible to recover the data 
stored inside this space. This subsection will be dedicated to the recovery of deleted files, which 
is a process known as data carving. Recovering deleted files can be done using two different 
methods. The first is to recover the deleted files from the server, but it requires the application to 
be logged in, or the account to be accessed through a web browser. Copy and ownCloud 
applications both allow the user to recover deleted files with a feature known as ‘undelete’. 
Dropbox does not have a similar feature, but it is possible to recover deleted files or previous 
version of files on an account accessed through a web browser. However, unlike Copy and 
ownCloud, Dropbox allows a permanent deletion option, that will permanently delete a file from 
an account. The second way to recover deleted files is through the use of a data carving tool on 
the local device. All the client applications analyzed in this research, when they first synchronized 
with the server, downloaded a copy of each file and stored them locally. As mentioned earlier, 
even if the files are deleted, the Ext4 file systems does not delete the inode entry, so both the 
inode entries and the files’ data content are still present on the hard drive. To see how the 
recovery is done, first we have to analyze how the file are allocated. Using the istat tool from the 
TheSleuth Kit an examiner is able to find the inode addresses of the files, the group to which they 
belong, and the block address of where the data content of the files is stored. The files are 
usually (but not necesseraly) stored in contigous inode addresses. Using the blkstat tool on the 
block addresses that contain the files’ data content, the output shows that the blocks are in fact 
allocated. By executing the fsstat tool it is possible to find the inode range address of the group 
and the range of the blocks where the data content is present (usually stored in a different group). 
Using dd on these ranges it will allow a forensic expert to create a small image that can be further 
analyzed with a hex editor. Now, we can examine if the files are still present once they are 
deleted. After deleting the files, blkstat will return that the blocks that store the data content are 
not allocated anymore. However, by opening the images with a hex editor, it is possible to 
determine that the data is still present inside the block. In addition, the inode entries are still 
present (a character has been added before the file name to indicate that the files pointed by the 
inode have been deleted). At this point, using a simple data carving tool such as Foremost or icat 
from the TheSleuth Kit, recovering the deleted files is fairly easy.   
  
6.8 Android OS  
A common feature of cloud storage services is that they allow multiple devices to be 
synchronized. Therefore, it is very likely that one user will synchronize the same cloud storage 
account on multiple devices. Thus, in order to gather as much data as possible, it is important to 
analyze not only workstations, desktops, and laptops but also devices such as smartphones and 
tablets. An operating systems that comes as default on many smartphone is Android OS. Client 
applications were both available for Copy and Dropbox, however, an official client at the time of 
the writing of this paper is not available for ownCloud. Nevertheless, an unofficial but very 
efficient client application has been published by the BezKloboukuNos team [21]. In the case of 
Copy the main files are found inside the folder /data/media/0/Android/data/com.copy/files. Among 
these files, the configuration.ini file contains different configuration and account settings, while the 
file copy.db stores names of the synchronized files along with the metadata of the files. The log 
file trace.log stores information regarding logins, synchronized files, timestamps, account 
information, and the client application’s process operations such as uploading, deleting and/or 
modifying files. The download directory inside the temp subdirectory contains the files that were 
locally saved, while the directory thumbnails-cache contains thumbnails. The file 
com.copy_preferences.xml in the directory /data/data/com.copy/shared_prefs stores other useful 
data such as the last opened file along with its timestamp. When the Copy application is deleted 
from Android OS, all the files are also deleted. However, information about the use of the 
application can be found in logs, such as logcat, which contains the system recent activity. 
Operations and actions executed by the Copy application, files and directory accessed were 
found inside logcat. ownCloud does not have an official client, but as mentioned above, an 
unofficial client is available. Once the application is installed, the directory 
/data/media/0/owncloudApp stores the sub-directory owncloud_user@server_address, which 
stores files that were downloaded locally on the device. The database file named filelist in the 
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folder /data/data/com.owncloud.androidApp/databases/ stores the list of the files synchronized 
along with the type of the file, the username, server name and address. The file 
com.owncloud.android/App_preferences.xml stores as well, the username and server address. 
When the application is removed, the directory /data/media/0/owncloud still contains the files that 
were locally stored, along with other temporary files. The rest of the files created by the 
application are deleted. Also in this case, recent activity can be found in logs such as logcat. The 
directory /data/data/com.dropbox.android/ stores local files, and the subdirectory databases 
contains database files. Unfortunately, also in the case of Android OS most of these files are 
encrypted. A file named 361753330-db.db inside the directory, stores the names of the 
synchronized files, and the file prefs-shared.db stores account preferences. Finally, recent activity 
of the user, including the use of Dropbox, can be found using logcat. A lack of analysis tools for 
Android OS, did not let us perform a dynamic search to gather the useful data remnants. In fact, 
the files above mentioned and listed were found through a manual search.  
 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK  
The first part of the research showed that it is possible to find plenty of evidence that relates to 
the use of a cloud storage client application on Windows 8.1, and evidence that relates to the 
activity of the user. These evidence is found mainly in databases and log files created by the 
application, but it also can be found inside the browser if a desktop client application version is 
not used, inside the memory, and inside the registry. If the application is then uninstalled, traces 
of the use and evidence can be found inside the memory, system log files, and registry keys and 
so on. If files are removed by the user there are two approaches that can help a forensic analyst 
to recover them. Possible future work can consist in a forensic analysis on the server side of the 
cloud, however, this is complicate issue since many problems arise, such as geography 
impossibility (servers can be spanned all over the world) and the servers can be outside 
jurisdiction of the investigators as well as a not transparent collaboration from the cloud service 
providers. The second part of the research proposed in this paper, highlighted the main locations 
and files on a client device with an Ubuntu 14.04, and more generally, a UNIX/Linux operating 
system. Although the operating system is different, as well as the file system, the results obtained 
by previous researches and the first part of this work, the results of this research are in 
accordance and similarities arise. Differences arise due to the different feature of the Windows 7 
and 8.1 operating systems and the UNIX/Linux OS, therefore locations and file types may vary. In 
fact, the registry, which is a classic feature of Windows is not present on UNIX/Linux systems so 
there will be no evidence related to it. Unfortunately, the amount of tools used to analyze 
dynamically a process, such as Process Monitor does not have a valid counterpart for 
UNIX/Linux, therefore a dynamical analysis to gather evidence is a bit harder. Nevertheless, it 
was still possible to find evidence in the hidden directories or hidden files created by the 
application, as well as in database or log files, inside web browser files, in the memory, and in 
both allocated and unallocated space. Many other locations and files on the file system, such as 
the cache, system logs, and configuration files stored useful data. Files stored on Android OS are 
similar to the files stored on laptops or desktops. However, one big difference is that, in the case 
of Ubuntu, the cloud application downloads and stores a copy of each file locally, while in the 
case of Android OS, a copy of a file is stored locally only if the file is accessed by the user. The 
fact that the files are stored locally, is really helpful during digital investigations since deleted files 
and their metadata are still present on the hard disk, unless the unallocated space is wiped or 
overwritten. Recently, most of the main cloud storage services, such as iCloud or Dropbox, 
started to encrypt their files, which makes it harder for digital experts to gather useful evidence. 
With a proper search warrant, the cloud service provider may be able to decrypt the files and 
allow forensics experts to gather evidence. Another key factor that can be seen in this analysis, is 
that even if the applications are different, the configuration files, database files, and log files (and 
use of hidden files and directories, cache directories and temporary files, database and log files) 
are similar. Finally, this research highlighted that a great deal of evidence can still be found on the 
Ubuntu system once the application is uninstalled or simply removed.   
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